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This paper begins with a discussion of prior research in the field of mutual fund               
performance and its determinants​, namely Morningstar ratings. Then an examination is           
conducted regarding Morningstar rating’s predictive ability of the performance of U.S.           
Growth mutual funds from 2015 – 2018 using similar data and methodology as the              
study by Morey and Gottesman (2006). This study concludes that the ratings are in fact               
a strong predictor of performance for the selected funds over this time period and that               
the results are monotonic in that 5-star rated funds perform better than 4-star and so on                
to 1-star rated funds which are the lowest performers. The implications of these results              
support the use of Morningstar ratings but investors should remain wary about individual             
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 A mutual fund is the go-to choice for investors to achieve diversification and 
market returns for low costs and transparent management. As of 2017​,​ there was more 
money in mutual funds than the total net assets of all US commercial banks by over two 
trillions dollars. But how does the average investor go about selecting which mutual 
fund in which to invest their hard-earned money? Some might use fees​,​ past returns​,​ or 
management style​,​ but the simplest criterion to examine would be that of a fund’s 
Morningstar rating. Morningstar is a rating agency that assigns funds a star rating from 
one​,​ which is the lowest​,​ to five​,​ which is the highest. In the age of Yelp reviews and 
Uber ratings​,​ Americans are more familiar than ever with simple​,​ straightforward rating 
systems and rely heavily on them to make decisions from who to hire to where to eat 
dinner. Because of this​,​ many funds use their assigned Morningstar rating in their 
advertising rather than other traits such as their own return history. 
 On their website​,​ Morningstar describes their star rating as “a purely quantitative​, 
backward-looking measure of a fund’s past performance.” The difference between 
comparing a fund’s past performance to future performance and Morningstar rating to 
future performance is not only that the rating is relative to other funds of similar size and 
in similar categories but also that the ratings are monotonic whereas returns can be 
calculated to multiple decimals. 
 Given the wide use of Morningstar ratings​,​ it is important to consider whether 
these ratings are worth being used to select mutual funds. This paper will discuss prior 
research in the field of mutual funds and Morningstar ratings and then perform an 
examination of whether these Morningstar ratings have any predictive ability over the 
future performance of the funds that they rate. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Mutual Funds and Outperformance 
In a recent paper by Gruber (2012​,​ p. 3)​,​ mutual funds were described as “one of the 
fastest growing type of financial intermediary in the American economy.” Mutual funds 
are popular for a number of reasons​,​ including ease of diversification and access to 
markets that an individual investor would not typically have on their own. These traits 
are derived from the structure of mutual funds in which investors pool their money for 
the purpose of investing in a wide range of assets such as stocks​,​ bonds​,​ commodities​, 
derivatives​,​ and other assets. These funds are run by portfolio managers who typically 
charge a small fee and the returns (or losses) are distributed back to the investors 
based on the amount invested. The performance of these funds is typically measured 
against a stated benchmark index outlined in the prospectus. 
 Outperformance is a commonly debated topic in the realm of mutual funds​,​ as 
well as in the world of investing in general. For the purposes of mutual funds​,​ this is 
defined as the ability to deliver returns higher than that of the comparable benchmark of 
the fund. There is a substantial amount of research and resulting literature dedicated to 
answering the questions of whether mutual funds are capable of outperforming and if 
so​,​ how. All of the studies result in different findings that land all across the board​,​ up 
and down the spectrum. Lack of consensus is what keeps this topic continuously 
fascinating and out of it comes new and innovative ideas for measuring exactly how 
these funds function and what factors can lead to outperformance. 
 In Kosowski et al. (2006)​,​ the authors land on the far end of the spectrum that 
states that outperformance is not a function of luck and can be executed based on skill. 
By examining twenty-five years of mutual fund returns they negate the notion that 
outperformance can be explained by sampling variability and determine that some 
managers are in fact worth paying high-fees for and that manager selection is a vital 
step in the process of mutual fund investing. On the other hand​,​ Fama and French 
(2011) represent the other extreme​,​ concluding that fund outperformance is almost 
entirely attributed to luck and that no manager decisions show statistically significant in 
contributing to outperformance. Albeit​,​ using slightly different methodology and time 
periods​,​ it is still astounding that two studies examining the same topic can result in 
such varied conclusions. 
2a. Predictors of Outperformance 
2a(I). Expenses and Fees 
 Given the popularity of mutual funds as investment vehicles​,​ selecting the correct 
mutual fund is still a very important decision. If a mutual fund is an individual’s primary 
investment vehicle​,​ even a couple of percentage points​,​ over time and after 
compounding​,​ can have major life implications. There are many different attributes of a 
mutual fund that one can use to select which fund they will end up investing in. One 
attribute is the fees that a fund charges​,​ usually a small percentage of your investment 
or returns. Another is the expense ratio which is the amount of operating expenses​, 
management fees​,​ administrative fees​,​ and other asset-based costs (excluding 
brokerage fees) incurred by the funds compared to the amount of overall fund assets. 
One can also select a fund based on the manager of the fund and the manager’s style 
of investing or past performance. 
Of these attributes​,​ the predictor of outperformance most supported by relevant 
literature is that of expenses​,​ specifically expense ratio. Studies by Carhart (1997)​, 
Dellva and Olson (1998)​,​ O’Neal (2004)​,​ Haslem​,​ Baker and Smith (2008)​,​ and 
Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009) all contribute supporting evidence in their conclusions 
that low expense ratio funds outperform funds with relatively higher expense ratios. In 
particular​,​ the paper by Carhart (1997) which examines almost 2000 U.S. equity funds 
from 1962 – 1993​,​ demonstrates that a one percent increase in expense ratio results in 
a 1.54 percent decrease in fund performance. More recently​,​ Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu 
(2009) offer support to this theory by finding that worse performing (load-adjusted) funds 
charge higher expense ratios than funds offering higher load-adjusted returns. A study 
from the Financial Research Corporation in 2002 (Predicting Mutual Fund Performance 
II: After the Bear (Financial Research Corporation)) as well as a Morningstar study by 
Kinnel (2010) found that a fund’s expense ratio is not only the best predictor of 
outperformance but the only factor that produced statistically significant results. 
The rationale behind the correlation between expense ratios and outperformance is that 
funds that are capable of outperforming consistently are in higher demand and therefore 
able to charge more to investors who wish to contribute to the fund. In this vein​, 
Wermers (2000) and Kosowski et al. (2007) find that higher expenses are justified for 
some funds​,​ as the managers are capable of outperformance via active management. 
As with any other research around outperformance and mutual funds​,​ there is a 
significant amount of findings that support that it is ​not​ expense ratio​,​ rather a different 
factor or no factor at all. Cemers and Petajisto (2009) and Patejisto (2013) conclude that 
the degree to which the holdings in a mutual fund are different than those of the 
benchmark is the main driver of outperformance. A redemption fee is a fee applied to 
shares held for short time periods and studies by Dellva and Olson (1998)​,​ Finke​, 
Nanigian and Waller (2009)​,​ and Ismailescu and Morey (2012) find a positive 
relationship between the size and duration of the redemption fee and fund performance. 
There are also studies from Elton​,​ Gruber and Blake (2003) and Cremers​,​ Dreissen​, 
Maenhout and Weinbaum (2009) that argue that funds with incentive fees outperform 
those without incentive fees. Incentive fees are paid to managers as a reward for strong 
performance and are similar to what is referred to “skin in the game” or high ownership 
stake by managers. 
So what is to be drawn from all of these studies that present varying and often 
contradictory results about expenses loads and other fees? Well​,​ it’s important to note 
that ​generally​ researchers find a negative correlation between outperformance and a 
fund’s expense/loads​,​ but this is not canon and some active managers can​,​ in fact​, 
deliver consistent returns that exceed those of the benchmark and are worthy of their 
fees. Incentive and manager fees seem to play some role in outperformance​,​ but again 
not every study supports this. All in all​,​ there is no one factor or attribute of a fund that 
can determine whether this fund or manager will be capable of delivering desirable 
returns. 
2a(II). Past Performance 
 An obvious consideration when selecting a mutual fund is the past performance 
of a fund; that is​,​ how has the fund done in the past regarding returns compared to the 
returns of the benchmark. Like the factors discussed in the section prior​,​ the findings 
from relevant literature on the subject vary significantly. 
 Studies that display that performance persists (outperformers will outperform 
again and vice versa) include those of Grinblatt and Titman (1992) and Hendricks​,​ Patel 
and Zeckhauser (1994) and Elton​,​ Gruber and Blake (1996). However​,​ studies including 
Carhart (1997) find that this persistence is often due to momentum stocks and 
eventually conclude that the additional transaction costs of investing in these 
momentum stocks are so high that they eradicate gains from following this strategy. 
This means that persistence only ends up applying to poor performing funds. Thus the 
consensus is that outperforming will persist up to a few quarters while poor performance 
will typically persist longer and neither should necessarily be used entirely to select a 
fund. 
2b. Morningstar Ratings 
 It is clear that of all the factors considered thus far​,​ none are satisfactory in 
selecting a fund. Expenses​,​ fees​,​ and past performance were good predictors in some 
findings​,​ bad in others​,​ and inconclusive in most. There are many private providers of 
mutual fund “ratings.” The most famous and regarded of which is that from Morningstar. 
Morningstar uses an algorithm that involves a combination of risk-adjusted past 
performance and awards mutual funds a star rating from one to five. This is inherently 
appealing to investors because of its simplicity and because it has become familiar and 
standard in the industry. These ratings have become so popular in fact that they have a 
significant impact on fund flows as evidenced in findings from Del Guerico and Tkac 
(2005). They conclude that a fund with a 5-star rating produces inflows of 53 percent 
above the normal flow while downgrades in star ratings can result in significant 
outflows​,​ more so than would be justified solely from a change in performance. 
 Due to the commonality and usage of these ratings​,​ a substantial amount of 
research has been done on whether ratings have any sort of predictive ability including 
studies from Blake and Morey (2000)​,​ Morey (2002a​,​ 2002b​,​ 2005) and Morey and 
Gottesman (2006). Once again we see contradictory results from different studies. 
Some studies find that funds that receive higher ratings relative to others do not result in 
outperformance​,​ like Blake and Morey (2000). In their findings​,​ the 5-star funds 
performed about the same as 3-star rated funds after ratings were established. Phillips 
and Kinniry (2010) support these findings. 
 In contrast​,​ Morey and Gottesman (2006) again tested the predictive ability of 
Morningstar ratings after Morningstar updated their methodology in rating mutual funds. 
In this study​,​ they found that the new rating system was​,​ at least in some part​, 
predictive of future fund performance as higher rated funds outperformed lower. In this 
study​,​ they even found that funds with a rating one star lower than other funds 
performed lower (so 5-star performed better than 4-star which performed better than 
3-star and so on). 
 In conclusion​,​ there is a wealth of dissonance​,​ contradiction​,​ and uncertainty in 
all the studies considered in this review as well as in the industry as a whole. No factor 
seems to be consistent in predicting performance​,​ but on the other hand​,​ every factor 
seems to play some sort of role. I have decided to reexamine the Morningstar rating’s 
predictive ability because of the (perhaps exaggerated) common use of the ratings and 
the variability in past studies. The contrast in these findings​,​ as well as the fact that they 
could be considered outdated​,​ are justification for this study in which I recreate the 
Morey and Gottesman (2006) study with data from 2015-2018. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
I will take the Morningstar rating on January 1​,​ 2015 for all US Equity Large Cap Growth 
mutual funds (single share class) and measure monthly mean returns, using the Sharpe 
ratio and the 30-day T-bill rate, through January 1​,​ 2018. I will then use a regression 
analysis to compare the funds’ ratings with the performance.​ ​A regression analysis 
allows a comparison of the performance of each group of funds based on their 
Morningstar rating​.​ I will use the 3-star rated funds as the reference group because it is 
the center rating and will allow me to see how much better (or worse) 5-star and 4-star 
funds perform and how much worse (or better) 2-star and 1-star funds perform, 
relatively​. 
 To select funds I use the January 2015 Morningstar Mutual Funds Data Disk. 
This disk provides data for funds as of January 1​,​ 2015. From this disk​,​ I then select all 
domestic equity funds that received an overall Morningstar mutual fund rating. This 
produced a sample of 4​,​700 funds. I use domestic equity funds as these styles are the 
most popular for domestic investors. 
 I then narrow the sample by eliminating replicate funds. Replicate funds are 
funds that are identical to another fund in our sample except that they are sold as 
different share classes. Since I do not want to over count the number of funds in the 
sample​,​ I include only one of the fund’s share classes in the sample. By eliminating 
these replicate funds​,​ funds in other currencies​,​ and those that did not have a ticker 
symbol or Morningstar rating on January 1​, ​2015​,​ I attain a sample of 305 funds. 
 For each of the 305 funds​,​ I then attempt to obtain the out-of-sample returns of 
these funds. For a large majority of the funds (approximately 80 percent) obtaining the 
out-of-sample returns is simply a matter of following the fund’s future performance. 
However​,​ for about 20 percent of the sample​,​ the funds disappear prior to January 1​, 
2018 as a result of liquidations or mergers. This means that my study is affected by 
survivorship bias​,​ but the purpose of the results are for directional insight instead of an 
exact correlation calculation. 
 To calculate the ratings​,​ Morningstar uses load-adjusted returns to reflect the 
extra expenses that the funds charge. However​,​ the monthly fund returns that are 
available on Morningstar data are not adjusted for front or deferred loads. As a result​,​ it 
is important for us to adjust the out-of-sample returns for loads when investigating 
whether the ratings are able to predict future performance. Moreover​,​ for investors​, 
load-adjusted performance is what they are typically concerned with. 
3a. Performance 
 A risk-adjusted performance metric is used to measure out-of-sample 
performance: the Sharpe ratio. For each performance metric​,​ only load-adjusted returns 
are examined. 
 Sharpe ratio: 
where  are the monthly returns in excess of the 30-day T-bill rate​,​ ​,​ of the ​i ​th mutual 
fund during the out-of-sample period​,​ and  is the standard deviation of the . 
3b. Predictive Performance 
 A cross-sectional dummy variable regression analysis is used to examine the 
out-of-sample predictive performance: 
 where  is the out-of-sample performance metric for fund ​i​. 
D5 = 1 if the fund received 5-star overall Morningstar rating as of January 1​,​ 2015​,​ 0 if 
not​, 
D4 = 1 if the fund received a 4-star overall Morningstar rating as of January 1​,​ 2015​,​ 0 if 
not​, 
D2 = 1 if the fund received a 2-star overall Morningstar rating as of January 1​,​ 2015​,​ 0 if 
not​, 
D1 = 1 if the fund received a 1-star overall Morningstar rating as of January 1​,​ 2015​,​ 0 if 
not​, 
i = 1 through N​,​ where N is the total number of funds in the sample. 
 In the above equation​,​ the 3-star fund group for the Morningstar sample is the 
reference group for the dummy variable regressions. Hence​,​ when using the Sharpe 
ratio as the out-of-sample performance measure​,​ the coefficient​,​ γ0 represents the 
expected Sharpe ratio when all the dummy variables are equal to 0​,​ and the coefficients 
γ1 through γ4 represent the differences between the dummy variables and the 
reference group. For example​,​ a negative γ1 implies the group of 4-star funds performs 
worse than the group of 5-star funds; a positive γ1 implies the group of 4-star funds 
outperforms the 5-star fund group. The t-statistics on the coefficients provide a test of 
the significance of the difference between an individual dummy group and the reference 
group. 
 I use the 3-star funds as a reference group because it provides a center from 
which I can compare the performance of the higher-rated and lower-rated group funds. 
If the ratings accurately predict out-of-sample performance I should see increasingly 
positive (and significant) coefficients for five and four and increasingly negative (and 
significant) coefficients for two and one. 
4. RESULTS 
 The results of the dummy variable regression are presented in the table below​. 
 Five has a positive coefficient that is greater than four which also has a positive 
coefficient and two has a negative coefficient which is greater than one which also has a 
negative coefficient. The p-values are all low enough for the results to be statistically 
significant at a 5% significance level​,​ other than the two-star rated funds which are 
significant at a 15% level. Based on this data​,​ Morningstar ratings are in fact predictive 
of mutual fund performance and funds with higher star ratings deliver higher 
load-adjusted returns than those with a rating lower relative rating. 
5. CONCLUSION 
 In this study​,​ I perform an examination of how the Morningstar rating system 
predicts future fund performance. I investigate the predictive power of the Morningstar 
rating system using all domestic Growth equity funds that were rated by Morningstar as 
of January 1​,​ 2015 and then examine the performance of all these funds over the next 
three years, out-of-sample​,​ January 2015 – January 2018. 
 I find widespread support for the notion that the new Morningstar rating system 
can predict future performance​,​ at least in the first three years out of sample. 
Specifically​,​ I find that higher rated funds​,​ for the most part​,​ significantly outperform 
lower rated funds. Moreover​,​ the effect is relatively monotonic as even the next to 
lowest rated funds (2-star funds) significantly outperform the lowest rated funds (1-star 
funds). These results are quite different from those of Blake and Morey (2000) and 
Morey (2002b) which indicated that the previous Morningstar rating system did not 
predict future performance well. 
 One explanation for this disparity may be fund expenses. Research by Carhart 
(1997) has found that fund expenses are inversely related to future fund performance. 
That is​,​ funds with low expenses seem to perform better in the future than those with 
high expenses. Thus​,​ an explanation for our results could be that before the change in 
the ratings methodology​,​ 5-star funds had similar expenses to the other funds and 
hence did not perform better in the future than other​,​ lower-rated funds. Yet​,​ after the 
change in the methodology​,​ 5-star funds have significantly lower expenses than other 
funds and thus the high star rating can predict strong future performance. 
 Another​,​ better explanation may be the “hot hands phenomenon” as first 
described by Hendricks​,​ Patel and Zeckhauser (1988). They find that there is short-term 
persistence in fund performance. Given that my out-of-sample period is only three years 
long​,​ I may be capturing this effect. Indeed​,​ if the methodology of the rating system was 
flawed before June 2002​,​ it is possible that the hot hands effect would not have shown 
up in performance prediction results from the old Morningstar ratings methodology. 
Now​,​ with the improvements in the ratings methodology​,​ the hot hands phenomenon 
may surface. 
 It’s important to take note of the time period and economic conditions of the time 
period in which these returns were recorded. 2015 – 2018 was a very positive economic 
environment in which the stock market consistently rose with less than historically 
average corrections or downturns. It also was a very low interest rate environment​, 
coming off of the recession but after full recovery which allowed business to reinvest 
heavily. This was also a time period characterized by a notable amount of share 
buybacks from companies​,​ inflating stock prices over time. Given all of this​,​ mutual 
funds required little strategy other than tracking the market to deliver returns. The 
methodology of this study did not consider the benchmark to which these funds were 
matched but only relative performance to funds in the sample. This being said​,​ funds 
that performed poorer over this time period could very well be positioned to outperform 
in a bear market or a time period with more corrections and less stable economic 
forces. 
 The implications of these findings are far-reaching considering the wide use of 
Morningstar ratings by investors to determine which funds to invest in. The conclusion 
that the ratings are predictive of performance means that the heightened inflows into 
higher rated funds found by Del Guerico and Tkac (2005) are justified. It also means 
that Morningstar has successfully honed its rating methodology. Investors should 
remain wary​,​ because although the sample reflects that the ratings are predictive of 
returns​,​ it does not mean that individual funds necessarily will outperform or 
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